I don’t need God in order to live a good life, is a common reply from atheists to the moral argument(s) for God. This rejoinder is one that begins with a fundamental misunderstanding of what theists mean when they speak of objective moral duties, or of doing right. Of course the theist will readily agree that one need not have belief in God to live a moral life; nevertheless, when the atheist claims that humans can be good without believing in God, he completely misses the point of the argument.
The moral argument is not that we can’t be good without a belief that God exists. The argument is that objective moral values and duties don't exist at all, unless they are grounded in an objective, wholly just, and transcendent, Lawgiver. By way of analogy, let's take space(time) for example: According to modern cosmology, there is no privileged reference frame (perspective), and whether you are located to the left or right of some other object is a relative matter -- there really is no up or down either. Because you are simply relative to the location of other objects (in space), there just is no position that can be said to be objectively here or there -- at least no meaningful way to articulate that notion. The theist will submit, likewise, that there is no way to determine whether actions are really right or really wrong without an objective Paradigm of good (best); and, that, in order to recognize we are capable of acting properly, we must have some basis for determining right and wrong, other than our own perspectives and opinions. My opinion, in the absence of God as the peerless standard, is merely relative other peer's opinions, which fare no better on the grand scale. So, "how do we prioritize one viewpoint over another on atheism, or humanism, or naturalism?" one might ask. No one can truly say which (if any) opinion is objectively binding, even if we gain consensus on a particular set of rules.
Some will argue that morality just evolved alongside consciousness, and that this is the extent of its origin. No external standards are necessary. Of course, the obvious response to this is, from where do moral values evolve? Unless a moral foundation is already in place, no evolution of its tenets could occur; certainly not ex post facto. Moreover, conscious observers [participants] could in no way claim that actions, which occurred under previous circumstances and guidelines, involving less evolved creatures, were really wrong. Of course, the initial participants couldn't know that their actions were right or wrong, without appealing to some antecedent principles; and, no mechanism could possibly account for the evolution of such, without a requisite foundation. So, whether we think moral values and duties evolve or not, pre-existing standards are required to elicit any change whatever, which just validates the theistic view.
Imagine you wanted to play Monopoly with a few friends. Further suppose that no player had prior experience with the game,and that previous participants had lost the rulebook. After some time for deliberations, you and your friends could probably establish a set of rules that would closely resemble the original ones; the fact that the game’s designer(s) included a very specific set of instructions, notwithstanding. The group could probably get on quite well, as long as everyone played by the same rules. Does the fact that a set of practical rules could be established imply that the original guidelines are invalidated or nonexistent? I think not. The theist will agree that we might indeed figure out what the original rules were, over time.
Let’s imagine now, that one of your three friends—the guy who happened to be the banker—decided he would no longer play by the agreed upon rules; that Jim, to the chagrin of others in the group, thought it OK to take a few extra hundreds from the till, whenever no one was looking. Of course, you, or another player, might protest that he was cheating or acting selfishly. Upon being caught red handed, suppose Jim firmly resisted the charges, stating that his rules were just as good as yours, and that he no longer wished to abide by the previously established rules. Who would be right in this case; and what should be done? He is, after all, correct that his conventions are just as good as the decided upon ones, if there really are no objective guidelines for playing the game. If Jim were a cunning tactician, his scheme may never be uncovered. In that case, he would never realize adverse consequences for his behavior. Would his deeds, then, be really wrong? If so, why, on atheism, would this be the case?
To drive this point home, let’s put the idea to test in a hypothetical, but real-life based, scenario. Anyone following the news of late is quite aware that the Catholic Church was recently rocked by numerous allegations of abuses by priests against adolescent boys. Many have become aware of similar, but unrelated, charges directed toward Jerry Sandusky, who is also accused of preying on young boys he was given charge over. The Penn State assistant coach was pilloried—as were the clergy—in both television newscasts and national newspapers. Angry interlocutors, publicly expressing their outrage, hoped every one of these abusers would be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law; and rightly so, in light of their egregious behavior.
You will recall that Sandusky, at first, denied having a problem, maintaining that his contact with the adolescents was consensual. In some cases, the abuse was discovered long after his involvement with the boys had ended. Were his deeds not exposed, the coach may have continued to violate these young men, and perhaps claim even more victims. As shocking as the multiple allegations were, this type of behavior undoubtedly occurs elsewhere, under a variety of circumstances. Many perpetrators, in fact, will never appear before a court of law. And, it’s anyone’s guess as to whether they will ever pay for their crimes. (What if the deeds took place 4000 years ago, under a completely different ethic?)
Now, for this arguments sake, let us assume that the dreadful behavior of these abusers was never discovered, and that all repercussions were ultimately positive for everyone involved. Because of the way the boys were treated by the elder men, they learned valuable life lessons, which propelled them to great success in both their relational and their financial affairs. Here, let’s suppose also that no physical or psychological harm resulted from the encounters. What then could be said to be wrong with the behavior of Jerry Sandusky or the Catholic priests? In the end, their alleged exploitations would have yielded a tremendous bounty of human flourishing. It could indeed be argued that these seemingly bad deeds were necessary for the greater good.
The atheist may protest that my hypothetical scenario(s) could never occur in the real world, because everyone knows that the aforementioned abuses are really wrong. But a quick glance at human history belies this assertion. Of course, most would immediately recognize that something bad had taken place; nevertheless, many atrocities have been carried out—by popular consensus no less—in the name of the law or of good. Even today, certain religious adherents consider it praiseworthy to kill others for holding different beliefs. Unborn children are said to be less than persons, until they are viable outside the womb. Who makes this distinction, and by what authority?
Now, I am not interested in whether or not moral duties change (from a human perspective) over time; or, whether every people group adopts its own seemingly distinctive set of laws. I am interested in the foundation of moral duties, irrespective of beliefs. Are they the result of socio-biological conditioning or societal norms? Could moral duties be the result of a purely naturalistic herd mentality among Homo sapiens? Do other species exhibit moral virtue? How do moral duties supervene on conscious states? These are the questions I am concerned with.
Of course, the atheist’s moral code might parallel that of the theist, or even surpass it in excellence. This will come as no surprise to the theist, who believes a good moral compass—assuming proper functionality—is intrinsic to the nature of human beings, just as the Bible implies. We may just apprehend moral duties gradually, in the same way we learn about the physical world around us: through experience and observation. This view might account for variations in moral values and duties better than the position that no objective standards exist. With history in view, we can see that popular consensus can be gravely mistaken about moral duties. After all, if keeping other men as slaves has been justified so recently in our past, we had better not look to human ideals for guidance.
If humans are merely byproducts of time plus matter plus chance, and thoughts (about morality) are determined by electro-mechanical, biochemical, and neuronal interactions where do morals come from and how do moral duties attach themselves to our conscious states? If humans have no free will to act or to refrain from acting, can moral duties be said to exist at all? How can moral responsibilities be binding; and, who can be held accountable for her actions, if she ultimately has no choice? I submit that no person is, at the end of the day, responsible for what he (apparently) does, good or bad, if Materialism is true.
Sam Harris suggests, in his book, Letter to a Christian Nation, that morals are based on human flourishing. But, how is that even helpful? Slaves, from the late 18th century and into the heyday of the cotton industry in the early 19th—not to mention Jews during Hitler’s time in power—were simply defined in such a way as to fall outside the classification of human being. If human flourishing is to be considered the “be all end all,” it would certainly help if the definition of person were not so fluid. Perhaps one day, Christians—or maybe some other intellectually inferior group—will be considered expendable by the majority. If humans are, after all, products of a mindless and purposeless scheme like natural selection, winnowing random genetic mutation, then what is to prevent such a position of animosity toward "inferiors" who don’t deserve the same rights and privileges as the rest of the populous?
Even if we grant—for the sake of argument—that humans deserve to flourish, and that we can know exactly what that flourishing entails; why is human flourishing important? Why not antelope flourishing, or bacterial flourishing? Unless humans really are "special creations” of the universe—they cannot be on naturalism—then Harris and others seem to be clearly engaging in what some have called species-ism. If Homo sapiens are to be elevated above other creatures—including those that may live under analogous moral systems—then, humans must somehow be objectively valuable and their actions really right, or really wrong. If the material universe is all there is, however, and humans are simply, tiny, insignificant, elements among an infinitude of other constituents, how well or how badly they behave is of no ultimate consequence.
