On Un-embodied Minds

All humans have a sense of person-hood. This is an inherent relational aspect of selves that is apparent in everyday language. Although the self appears to be—well—self evident, a few will yet deny its existence. Count Dr. Alex Rosenberg among these. Many more naturalists will argue that mind possesses no intentional efficacy; and, that all cognitive activity—because it is said to be driven by physical interactions among material constituents—is wholly deterministic; and, that specific nerve impulses in the brain are indeed causally prior to the choices a person thinks he is making. Though some will give lip service to the idea of free will, their materialist world view ultimately precludes it. These naturalists infer that—primarily on the basis that brains can be manipulated in some analogous fashion to that of other parts of the anatomy—there must be a mechanism of action dictating exactly what thoughts one will think.

An a priori commitment to metaphysical naturalism rationally portends the conclusion that intentional states of consciousness do not exist—the very definition of naturalism militates against purposive cognitive events. The self—its personal attributes including memories, desires, etc—is a mere illusion of (human) consciousness, and does not exist ontologically distinctive from the physiological brain. Thoughts, dreams, and emotions, are part and parcel of the mind effect. The amalgamation we experience as mind, or consciousness, is merely the emergent property of determined (possibly random) bio-mechanical activities within the physical brain. That is what modern naturalists tell us. The question is whether or not such a representation is accurate.

With respect to the extraordinary correlation between mind and brain, the supposed emergent utility of mind is quite disanalogous to other so called functions, as they relate to their own biological counterparts. Digestion, for example, is a function of the digestive tract; that relationship, however, is a one-way street. This is not the case with regard to the mind-brain dichotomy. And, therein lies the problem in describing mind as a mere function of the central nervous system. This bilateral relationship is obviously quite unique, in that the mechanisms of action—varying chemical components and neuronal impulses—in the brain precipitate certain functionality; but, the functional property of mind also influences and indeed manipulates the chemical and neural components within which it apparently resides.  

There is obviously something else going on with this mind-brain relationship besides mere emergence. One may, I think, logically and intuitively conclude that the self (mind) is much more than an emergent property of brain functionality. The mind, undoubtedly, operates as the control center for volitional activity. As director, I really can do as I please. Whether or not my apparent free agency is contingent upon the physiological makeup of the brain is of no consequence (My actions are also dependent on other anatomical structures for locomotion and communication etc—but no one will ever mistake my running for my leg; or, my tasting for my tongue.). I am simply constituted in such a way as to utilize the physical features of my body.

Does this mean that mind can and will persist after the mechanisms of action in the brain are extinguished, or that the self can be extricated from the body? These particular questions are not answerable on empirical evidence at present. Nevertheless, one may still have confidence in his apprehension of the enduring self. I cannot give direct physical evidence for the thing that I alone refer to as I, except by providing descriptions of the physical objects around me as I appreciate them through sensory receptors interacting with my consciousness. Nevertheless, I can, thereby, give strong (indirect) evidence that I am some thing or another. Though it is impossible to prove that each of us is a mind—or a soul that contains consciousness—we do have good philosophical, sociological, and psychological reasons to conclude that we are.

By the very nature of the case, it is quite evident that persons, or selves, are the only entities in the entire universe—both naturalists and theists agree on this point—capable of discovering and describing the various physical constituents around them; and, that minds are the sole purveyors of abstract commodities like arithmetic and logic, language and art. These facts alone, it seems, place the self in a unique and powerful position. Given the enormity of its explanatory scope, I think it would be very difficult to deny the existence of the (immaterial) entity we call the self; especially when one considers the fact that not only the aforementioned, but indeed, the whole of knowledge is inexorably reliant upon it. By denying the existence of the self, I only to confirm it.

Cognitive properties of mind—ideas, dreams, and motives, to name a few—can never be seen by anyone outside the requisite individual knower. Does this mean they do not exist? Of course not! How then do we measure these extant properties on empirical data? We can not—at least not yet—even with the most sophisticated instruments available (Perhaps, obtaining such evidences will forever remain outside the purview of the physical sciences.). In order to maintain a consistent approach to his materialist views it is convenient, then, for the naturalist to deem mental states inconsequential or illusory. The metaphysician amplifies his error in judgment, by extrapolating the idea of the illusory self to conclude that the theist’s suggestion of an un-embodied mind is, therefore, also an illusion (illusion having an illusion?). And rightly so. After all, if one is not convinced of his own mind, he should be quite wary of the suggestion that others exist.

From the cosmological argument—based on what we already know about the physical world—we may infer that the first cause of the universe is non-physical and spaceless, perhaps timeless. If such a non-physical object, like a mind or a self, cannot exist in the real world, then the proponent of Kalam is in serious trouble; his metaphysic is utterly mistaken. As a committed theist, I understand this very well. Nevertheless, I see no reason to jettison the notion of a distinctive self and its corollaries. If a mind can exist—it can be shown to, with all its functional cognitive attributes, including volitional efficacy—and is capable of exerting certain force on a physical entity such as the brain, and can manipulate chemical and neural activity therein, and subsequently, the world around it; there is good reason, I think, to believe a first mind may do likewise (I belabor the point.).

We may plausibly conclude that the functionality of the physical brain is causally related to the immaterial mind in a bilateral communicative sense. That is, the relationship can and does work from either direction. The brain, with its control of autonomic—sympathetic and parasympathetic—responses, does not, so far as we know, dictate every action of human will. I may, for example, choose what I wish to think about. By deciding to think about a particular subject—I can take causal action on those thoughts—my immaterial mind elicits changes to the requisite brain chemistry, and thereby affects the physical world around me (This type of causation is what philosophers refer to as agent causation.). That the self becomes aware of its decision(s) only after the electro-chemical impulse(s) is detectable by third party observation is of no consequence here. The self yet reserves the right to refrain from acting at all. Although, a similar impulse may be detected when his choice (not to act) is made.   

If one accepts the proposition that a nonphysical self resides within the confines of her own anatomy, is it not therefore plausible that a first immaterial and transcendent—and extremely powerful—personal agent exists? One who exerts His will in creating the universe and making man in His image? The methods by which He does so need not be fully understood (We certainly don’t need to identify every detail of gravitational force to have some understanding of what gravity does; it is quite obvious that this force causes material objects to fall back to earth when the items are thrust into the air.). I am not suggesting that we discontinue research into the unknown mechanisms, or that knowing more is unhelpful. I am merely stating that the prospect of a transcendent first mind seems metaphysically possible.

Here, it is conceded that all minds, which are detectable by natural means, are in some way connected to a physical brain—no empirical data precludes their existence. It must, nonetheless, be acknowledged that whatever its composition, the self is a very capable mechanism. The qualitative property of mind—if it exists at all—is an invisible, non-physical, entity that is able to subsist without space (How large is a  mind? Or what is the atomic weight of my consciousness?). Either the mind exists non physically, or it does not exist at all. Nevertheless, it is obviously true that each of us experiences the world as an actually existing self. It could be true, however, that our physical brains have individually and collectively been duped into believing something nonsensical—even possessing belief in the first place. Nevertheless, I am quite certain that I exist (as a free moral agent); and, I am equally convinced that others experience their own self realization. So for me, no leap of faith is required to postulate a first mind, Who is ultimate, powerful, creative, and personal. This is precisely the God of traditional monotheism.